Forbes post, “Can We Fix ‘The Price We Pay’ For Medicare? A New Book Shows Some Ways Forward”

Originally published at Forbes.com on June 18, 2020.

 

When it comes to planning for retirement, the fundamental math is straightforward: your income in retirement (including reasonable savings spend-down) must equal or exceed your expenses.

Experts therefore worry about retirement readiness in terms of the degree to which Americans will have sufficient income in retirement — for example, the Center for Retirement Research calculates a National Retirement Risk Index by measuring the degree to which Americans are likely to reach or fall short of an objective of “maintain[ing] their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement.” But that’s only half of the equation; equally important but not addressed nearly as often is the other half, the expense side. And it’s for this reason that I want to share some bits & pieces of a recently-published book, The Price We Pay: What Broke American Health Care – And How To Fix It, by Marty Makary, as I clear out my bookshelf of library books in anticipation of my library’s re-opening.

Makary is a surgeon and professor and, according to his Wikipedia profile, “an advocate for high-consensus, common-sense reforms in healthcare.” His book, based on his own efforts at reform, profiles shocking ways in which healthcare costs are higher than they ought to be, and ways to reduce those costs without impacting — or even improving — quality of care.

The book begins with the example of a health fair at an African American congregation in Washington, D.C., where medical staff screen patients for “claudication” — a blockage of a leg artery which can be removed by a stenting procedure, the same sort of procedure that had become enormously popular for heart vessels, but now, thankfully, in decline after having been shown not to be beneficial in most cases, and subject to public scrutiny. This new income stream — costing patients modest sums and Medicare substantially more, $10,000 for a brief procedure (or triple the cost for private insurance) — “can generate $100,000 in one day when a doctor owns the facility,” Makary writes, and nearly always without genuine medical necessity, but instead by means of identifying prospective patients through health fair or after-church screenings.

Makary then backs up a bit to discuss the scandal of hospitals overcharging patients in any instance where they don’t have in-network insurance, whether they’re uninsured or simply out-of-network. Examples he gives of hospitals billing patients “chargemaster” rates that are as much as 3 – 5 times higher than what insurance companies pay, offering meager reductions for “financial assistance,” then taking to court patients who can’t pay are appalling enough (and are just as prevalent among nominally non-profit as for-profit hospitals) that Congress is already looking at remedies to “surprise billing,” or had been doing so, in a bipartisan effort, before the pandemic hit.

Another example that’ll make your blood boil is the escalating cost of air ambulances: rather than hospitals owning the helicopters, private companies moved in. The charges were no longer covered by insurance, or, at any rate, they were covered on an out-of-network basis so that patients were left with high residual costs, and patients opened up horrifically-enormous bills: $50,000; $100,000; or more — and, what’s worse, for cases where the air ambulance wasn’t even necessary, but medical staff recommend or insist on it, receiving kickbacks along the way, and patients have no idea of the cost they’re incurring.

And while price-gouging might be solved by putting all Americans on a government-run healthcare system with prescribed payscales, that’s only one component of the problem. Makary profiles obstetricians with excessively-high C-section rates because doctors want to avoid disruption to their evenings, doctors who counsel and perform back surgery for patients who (as is nearly always true) would be better off with physical therapy, doctors who perform an upper endoscopy and a lower colonoscopy on two separate days to maximize billing rather than both-at-once to maximize patient welfare; and more. He describes the overuse of opioid prescriptions for no other reason than lack of effort in the medical profession to determine what was actually best for patients rather than doing what they’d always done. He even cites his own experience being prescribed heartburn medication rather than diet modification, and cholesterol-reducing statins without addressing his particular health- and family history. “Medicare for All” offers no answers here, especially given its promises of unlimited medical care with any provider.

More rackets: health insurance brokers who sell their employer-clients on the insurance plan which pays them the largest commission rather than offering clients the best deal. (Employers are increasingly aware and moving to other business models.) Pharmacy benefit managers where rebates and “spreads” leave employers struggling to manage costs (especially since there are only three such firms bidding on employers’ business, stymying employers’ efforts to cut costs) and employees deceived as to the true cost of their medications. “Wellness programs” which don’t actually improve the well-being of employees.

What’s to be done? One of Makary’s own initiatives is simply to prod those doctors who are not cynically abusing the system, to reduce their overtreatment by educating them that they are far beyond the norm in their field. He also uses his position within his profession to educate his peers about what’s going on with medical costs that they may be wholly unaware of.

But the recommendation that’s the most promising is a complete re-do in terms of how healthcare is delivered, as illustrated by a new provider called Iora Health. This is a company, Iora Health, Inc., not a social services agency, but their business model is about improving their Medicare patients’ health in the long term by doing more than simply scheduling annual physicals or 15 minute visits and waving them away until the next appointment. Patients don’t simply have a doctor – they are assigned a health coach, and

“Iora doctors and nurses are free to take care of people in whatever way they see fit, ranging from home visits, to giving a ride to see a specialist, to enrolling their patients in one of their classes. They pride themselves in spending a lot of time with patients so they can understand the individual’s goals, struggles, and barriers. The Iora health coaches make everyone’s job a lot easier” (p. 157).

Their clinics have a community room where they host cooking classes and game nights. They follow up with patients who miss appointments, and provide rides if needed. They investigate the life circumstances of patients who don’t take their medication rather than writing them off. (How many of us have family members of our own who could have benefitted from this?)

Makary calls them the “Tesla of health care” — radically transforming healthcare, especially for Medicare enrollees with complex needs. And their results are impressive.

“After at least three months of engagement with an Iora care team, the number of patients whose hypertension was controlled increased from 59% to 74%. Results from a cohort of 1.176 Iora Medicare enrollees over an 18-month period showed hospital admissions cut in half and emergency department visits reduced by 20%. The totalmedical spending by the insurer declined 12%. Since that study, Iora has now reduced health care spending for the populations they care for by 15%. Imagine what a 15% reduction in Medicare’s roughly $1 trillion budget would mean for the country” (p. 164). Iora has practices in Texas, North Carolina, Atlanta, Phoenix, and elsewhere. A similar company, Oak Street Health, has 21 locations in Illinois, and a total of 36 elsewhere. ChenMed’s locations are primarily in Florida. All three provide services specifically for Medicare patients.

And their business model? The clinic is paid an annual lump sum.

Yes, they’re an HMO, more-or-less, though they work with insurers/Medicare, rather than directly with patient-customers — and, at the same time, HMOs were supposed to transform healthcare, decades ago, but didn’t. Why not? Are we ready for another try? Let’s hope so.

 

December 2024 Author’s note: the terms of my affiliation with Forbes enable me to republish materials on other sites, so I am updating my personal website by duplicating a selected portion of my Forbes writing here.

Forbes post, “Defund The Police, Cut Pension Liabilities? The One Weird Trick That Just Might Work For Chicago”

Originally published at Forbes.com on June 8, 2020.

 

Minneapolis wants to dismantle its police department. On Sunday, as CNN reported,

“Nine members of the Minneapolis City Council on Sunday announced they intend to defund and dismantle the city’s police department following the police killing of George Floyd.”

What exactly that means, and how that might play out, as CNN clarifies, and the Minneapolis Star Tribune fleshes out, is far from clear, as “defund” advocates want to prioritize social services but the city’s charter actually requires that it fund a police force.

Separately, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot announced a 90-day reform initiative. Turns out, the city was already supposed to have reformed its police department as a result of a consent decree in the aftermath of the Laquan McDonald shooting in 2014 — but city officials learned that implementing reform in the face of resistance and bureaucracy is actually harder than it looks. In particular, as Ed Bachrach and Austin Berg note in a Chicago Tribune commentary, that consent decree, and the disciplining of police officers in general, were made subordinate to police union collective bargaining agreements.

But it turns out there is a useful model for successful “defund the police” reform: the city of Camden, New Jersey, in which their police department was so irredeemable dysfunctional, not in terms of police brutality/racism but in their competence in basic police work, that it was indeed shuttered — not to leave its residents at the mercy of criminals, but with the county taking over policing duties.

Is this the right model for cities where prior attempts at reform have failed? I can hardly answer that question – not with any particular expertise.

But I nonetheless asked myself, “what would happen to pensions if the city of Chicago followed that same model?” Of course, that would be contingent on Cook County being able to step in as a more competent successor entity, but hypothetically let’s imagine that this is true, for the sake of argument.

Now, there are some unique characteristics to pensions in Chicago and Illinois.

In the first place, Illinois binds all of its pensions to the requirement that they be “neither impaired nor diminished” and the state Supreme Court has ruled that this requirement is very broad, encompassing future as well as past accruals, retiree medical benefits, and any form of benefit related to retirement.

In addition, most pension plans in Illinois have reciprocal agreements: individuals who move between the Chicago Teachers’s Pension Fund and the Teachers’ Retirement System, for example, can use their total years of service to qualify for benefits and have their highest average pay from either system used to calculate benefits from both systems. The same is true for Chicago and Illinois municipal workers, state employees, university employees, Cook County workers, and miscellaneous Illinois public employees.

But neither the police and fire plans for the city of Chicago, nor those plans for other Illinois municipalities, are included in these reciprocity agreements.

What’s that mean?

If the Cook County Sheriff’s Office took over policing in the city of Chicago, then, logically enough, no police officers would be employed by the Chicago Police Department, because it wouldn’t exist any longer.

That doesn’t mean that cops and retired cops would lose their pensions — the city of Chicago would still be liable. But for currently employed cops, they would only be liable for a “frozen” benefit — that is, based on their salary at the time of the take-over, without the benefit of the pay increases they would have gotten up to retirement, and without any service-based benefit improvements (such as early retirement benefits) that they would have earned in the future. In the private sector, this would be called a “curtailment,” because, logically enough, benefits were curtailed.

How much would that cut liabilities?

Here are the basic numbers, at year-end 2019 (I don’t wish to hazard a guess as to the post-covid-crash values):

Assets (market value, not smoothed): $3,162 million

Liability: $14,270 million.

Funded status: 22%.

The liability splits out into $5,725 million for active employees, and $8,931 for inactive participants (retirees, survivors of deceased employees, and vested terminations).

So what happens if the liability for the active police drops by, say, one-third due to these curtailment effects?

The new funded status would be — are you ready for it? — 25%.

Why such a small impact? That’s because the inactives’ liability makes up such a large fraction of the total — 65%.

But at the same time, in terms of actual dollars saved, it would work out to $1.9 billion. Turns out, that’s more than the entire CPD spends in a year, which amounts to $1.78 billion — but, of course, this would be a one-time reduction rather than an annual savings.

To be clear, this is a result that’s somewhat unique to Chicago. Most states’ police pensions are a part of a larger pension system, so that none of the above is relevant to them — for example, in Minneapolis, police officers participate in the PERA Police and Fire Plan alongside all other Minnesota pubic safety workers.

And, considering the bigger picture, actuary Mary Pat Campbell crunches the numbers and concludes that the chorus calling for the cutting of police department spending and reallocating the savings to social services misses the fact that, as a percentage of total state and local spending, police spending amounts to only 4% of the total. Her data source also reports that public welfare spending (e.g., Medicaid) amounts to 22%; elementary and secondary education, 21%; and higher education and health/hospitals, 10% each.

So nothing’s simple, and the impact of reform on police pensions — or, to the contrary, the impact of police pensions on the effectiveness of intentions to reform — is only a small tangent in a bigger story, but, as an actuary, it’s an interesting wrinkle nonetheless.

 

December 2024 Author’s note: the terms of my affiliation with Forbes enable me to republish materials on other sites, so I am updating my personal website by duplicating a selected portion of my Forbes writing here.

Forbes post, “April 15, 1981: A Snapshot In Retirement Policy History”

Originally published at Forbes.com on May 28, 2020.

 

Yesterday, as it happens, was slated to be the long-awaited launch of the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft, the first reusable rocket, the first private-sector spacecraft, and the first manned launch from the U.S. in nearly a decade. While it was postponed to Saturday due to weather, the prospect of this new era in spaceflight inspired me to dig out and show my children the newspapers I had personally saved (and recently rediscovered in the process of cleaning out my parents’ longtime home): the Detroit News, the Detroit Free Press, and the New York Times for April 15, 1981, the day after the space shuttle Columbia landed after its inaugural flight.

According to the Detroit News,

“Astronaut [John W.] Young caught the mood of much of the country yesterday. ‘We’re really not too far — the human race isn’t — from going to the stars,’ the world’s premiere test pilot said.”

According to the Free Press,

“The flawless return of the space shuttle Columbia to earth Tuesday opened a new age for Americans in space — an age that will allow space flight to become routine.”

According to the New York Times,

“Ultimately officials envision the shuttle being able to turn around in a matter of weeks. Each shuttle would have a life of 100 missions.”

In reality, the Columbia was returning from its 28th mission when it disintegrated in 2003 and the entire program, with a fleet of 5 space shuttles, had a total of 135 missions.

Of course this is a cautionary tale about believing grandiose claims, and a recognition that “there is nothing new under the sun.”

But — hear me out on this — the same is also true with respect to retirement issues.

Featured on the front page of the Free Press, just below the photograph of the Columbia touching down, in an article with the headline, “Young gives council budget and warning,” by Ken Fireman.

“With a warning that Detroit has one final chance to avoid fiscal disaster, Mayor Young Tuesday presented to the City Council a 1981 – 82 budget containing over $270 million in uncertain revenues.”

The budget contained 5% pay cuts for city employees, a hike in resident and commuter income taxes, and the sale of $100 million in bonds. Specifically,

“Another proposal certain to provoke controversy is Young’s call for the city’s two pension funds to buy ‘their full share’ of city-issued long-term bonds needed to liquidate the current deficit.

“The city currently owes a total of $18 million to the two funds from last year, and lingering bitterness over the longstanding debt may lead pension trustees to balk at buying any city bonds.”

On the op-ed page, syndicated columnist James J. Kilpatrick wrote, “There’s new hope for Social Security.”

“A House subcommittee last week made the first intelligent move in many years toward rescuing our Social Security system from the mess it is in. The subcommittee voted to increase gradually the age at which full retirement benefits are paid from 65 to 68.”

(Half a year later, the Washington Post reported that this legislation was killed in the Democratic-dominated House Ways and Means Committee.)

In the Detroit News, the secondary front page article was, “Plan threatens aid for elderly,” by Gary F. Schuster, which reported, with no details, that “President Reagan has decided to slash Social Security as the primary means of balancing the federal budget by 1985, White House aides said yesterday.”

And, finally, in an April 4 edition of the Detroit News (for which I can discern no reason it had been saved), “Pension dispute continues” (author name no longer legible) reports on court proceedings in which the police and fire pension fund were fighting to for the city to make pension contributions. While the first paragraph is no longer legible, the article reports,

“Olzark opened hearings two days after 6,000 police and fire retirees missed their April 1 paychecks. Faced with only $500,000 in cash to meet the $6.5 million monthly payout, the board’s trustees refused last week to liquidate short-term assets to cover the payment. . . .

“City officials had publicly acknowledged the $14.6 million debt since the suit was filed Feb. 25.

“But Sachs said he learned through ‘a flurry of paperwork this week’ that the city now claims it owes only $59 million, instead of the $102.5 million approved last year by the pension’s actuary and trustees and appropriated by Young and the Detroit City Council.”

(The article does not indicate the pension plan’s actual assets, liabilities, or funded status at the time.)

It’s no surprise that politicians and number-crunchers were worried about Social Security in 1981, and state and local governments have been kicking the can with respect to their pension funds for far longer than these 39 years. But it’s startling that even on a wholly arbitrary day, there’s so much material to illustrate this. And it’s still important to bear in mind how very longstanding these issues are when debating them now.

 

December 2024 Author’s note: the terms of my affiliation with Forbes enable me to republish materials on other sites, so I am updating my personal website by duplicating a selected portion of my Forbes writing here.